Currently at Toronto Pearson: 4. High today: 4. There has been snow on the ground, uninterrupted, in K-W for eight days now. K-W got a bit more sloppy snow today; Toronto's five days' growth of snow is just about finished going down the drain.
Last week I heard someone on the bus say that someone had won the $39 million in the Lotto 6/49 or whatever, and maybe someone asked "what would you do with all that money?" and I thought "what would I do with all that money?" and thought, well, first I'd give away $38 million ... only $38 million? No, maybe $38.5 million. And I thought, of course, this is why I would never play the lottery--but then I realized, maybe this is why I should play the lottery! When other people win, they usually spend the money on stupid stuff. (I guess.) But I would, I don't know, give it to Doctors Without Borders and whatever the hell. (I really don't know.) So, maybe I am actually morally required to play the lottery, in order to do my part to try to divert lottery money to something worthwhile.
Turns out I was wrong about the idea of deflation taking a long time to sink in. It was the lead headline in the Star today. Gas is below $0.80 a litre around here these days. Again I remember the Globe poll, some time after Katrina, asking whether gas would ever be less than $1/litre again. Most people said "no", of course. Most people would have said "no way in hell" a few months ago.
The price of a can of beans is up 40-60% since the summer in the local grocery store, though. For some reason the grocery price war is over; Loblaw's has been steadily jacking up its prices and just reported a large profit. This is going to be some jagged disinflation/deflation; I would guess that relatively poor people are going to continue to see steep inflation for some time, since they spend proportionally a lot on food and not much directly on energy. It has occurred to me to wonder as house prices fall whether the conditions that produce falling house prices put upward or downward pressure on rental prices. House prices are falling because people's ability to pay for houses is decreasing. If people's ability to pay for houses is decreasing, does that mean that people who would otherwise have been at the low end of the home-ownership market are forced into the rental market, increasing demand for, and thus creating upward pressure on the price of, rental units? And: does it result in a flattening of price differentials between the high end and low end of the rental market, as people are forced downward in the market, creating more demand and higher prices at the bottom of the market?
And I am still on strike. The deep, dark stupidity of it all is upsetting, but also amusing in its way. Somehow I have begun to love my enemies. Soon I'll find myself in love with the world, and the only thing left to do will be to ding a ding dang my dang a long ling long.
Monday, November 24, 2008
Friday, November 7, 2008
Strike Two
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 14. High today: 16.
So I'm on strike, for the second time in my ten years at York. (I'm not on strike at Laurier.) The ideological stridency of the union--apparently including most of the members, a large majority of whom are grad students (a large majority of whom are in the humanities and social sciences), not just the activists and the leadership (such as it is, which isn't much, since the activists have gutted the leadership structure since the last strike)--is remarkable. I can't help but feel that some political switch has been flipped lately in North America. The resurgence of the NDP, the financial crisis, Obama, the settled feeling that Iraq and Afghanistan have both been lost ... it's hard to tell how it all fits together, but somehow it seems to. But where's it all going? The members of the union generally seem to sincerely believe that there are no legitimate interests in the university contrary to their own. They believe that they have a moral right to dictate terms, without limitation, to the university. Of course, labour generally feels that it has an unlimited moral right against management on the Marxist ground (whether particular workers or unions are fully conscious of this or not) that all value in the enterprise is produced by labour and so all value in the enterprise is owed to labour. What seems different about this union this time--and this union is always among the most militant and ideologically driven you'll find anywhere--is the more-or-less complete refusal to compromise on the absolute claim of right for pragmatic purposes. No dialogue, no dialectic, just sheer self-assertion.
What's interesting about the union as a labour union is that the basic issue no longer has anything to do with compensation for labour, though it is constantly portrayed that way in the media because no one can understand what's going on in any other terms. (The numbers quoted on wage increases are meaningless because the main monetary issues are not technically about wages.) I have a feeling that if the general public knew what the real issue was, the people who are currently calling for the TAs to be fired Reagan-style would be calling for the university to be shut down. TAs already are not paid primarily for the work they do as TAs; they're paid primarily to support them while they're (supposed to be) doing their graduate work. If the relevant market was the market for TA labour, their compensation would presumably be much lower than it currently is. TAs get as much as they do currently, and they want much more than that, because the relevant market is not the market for TA labour but the market for graduate students, and that's a market in which the student-TAs not only hold much more leverage (because while the supply of potential TA labour greatly exceeds the demand, the demand for grad students on the part of schools does not exceed the supply of potential students by much at all), but also benefit from an ethical feeling on the part of their superiors that grad students ought not to live too shabbily. (A few years back, TA negotiations at U of T were blown out of the water when the administration came up with a student-support package that made the demands for TA compensation largely irrelevant.)
What the union wants for the 25% of us in the union who teach courses on contract is a whole other kettle of fish. That's all about "job security", and it's a real concrete issue. Job security is the oppressively insistent practical issue in my life. But from a relatively disinterested point of view, considering only the good of the university or of the philosophy department, I would not want the make-up of the teaching staff to be determined in any serious way by union rules; I want departments to be free to decide their own compositions. Materially, there appears to be a lot at stake for me in this strike (because the administration appears to be proposing serious concessions on mechanisms that can turn contract jobs into permanent jobs), but I'm ethically opposed to winning it.
Similarly, the union is claiming a tactical "victory" in these negotiations for persuading the administration to withdraw a proposal to increase the number of teaching jobs allowed to doctoral students. It's a "victory" because it leaves more jobs open for people like me; it's very much in my material interests. But my job security currently might not be so desperately tenuous if I had been able to get a teaching position while doing my PhD; ethically, I can only be in favour of making more teaching positions available to doctoral students. So why doesn't the union recognize this "victory" as a defeat for the doctoral students it represents? Looks to me like some combination of these reasons:
(1) York doctoral students don't believe that they will ever have teaching jobs after they graduate (and so don't see themselves as having an interest in gaining teaching experience; some of them, when in union-rhetoric mode, actually spin having teaching jobs as opposed to TA positions as a burden, since they take up much more time and their compensation is taxable (whereas the large part of TA compensation that doesn't take the form of wages is classed as student support and therefore is mostly not taxable)).
(2) York doctoral students don't understand that the single most important thing in helping them get teaching jobs after they graduate is teaching experience (presumably due in part to their having swallowed the "publications" Koolaid, not realizing that publications=jobs only applies to students whose doctorates have prestigious brand-names).
(3) The union collectively sees its interest in keeping peace among the different constituencies of the union (and having more teaching positions available for doctoral students would more obviously and immediately damage the material interests of the current corps of contract teachers than it would advance the material interests of doctoral students) as being more important than increasing the employability of doctoral students--but this, to me, just dissolves back into (1).
I think (1) is really at the heart of everything. Everyone knows, now, that, in material terms, doing a PhD is a losing "investment" (unless you're invested in one of the prestigious brand-names), so doctoral students like those at York have stopped seeing it as any kind of investment at all. They want the material pay-off from academia now, because they don't expect to get it later.
The really stupid thing about York's situation is that it is largely a product of a strategy over the last decade to dramatically increase graduate enrolment. The strike of 2000-01 should have made it evident to everyone that graduate students at York are a box crammed full of hornets. But since then, the university administrators have crammed a whole bunch more hornets into the box and shaken it. (I don't fully understand why they've done this. There appear to be two main reasons behind it: they want to make York a more "research-intensive" university, and the provincial and/or federal governments have been putting pressure on universities to produce more PhDs to make up for the shortage of professors which is always just around the corner. The first reason has been motivated in some part by the fear that if York is classed as a "teaching" university, the province will sooner or later force it to shut down its graduate programs altogether--so, by drastically increasing graduate enrollment, we're creating facts on the ground that would make that impossible. I can't imagine that that isn't sheer paranoia. But there is also the plain prestige of being a "research" university; I think that probably has more to do with it than anything.) My guess is that they don't recognize what they're doing as shaking a box full of hornets because they, like--it seems to me--almost everyone who has made it in academia, operate under the delusion that grad students are (and feel themselves to be) on the road to being as successful as they are. Those who have made it imagine that those who have not (yet) made it would identify with them and aspire to be like them. Instead, those who have not (yet) made it almost universally resent those who have made it, more and more intensely all the time.
I wish to God the "first black president" business would blow away. When you make some symbolic move out of a long national embarrassment, is it really something to celebrate? Should your family throw a party when Daddy stops beating Mommy? Shouldn't you, with your newly gained virtue, only feel all the more embarrassed at what you've been? Isn't it embarrassing that the president's skin colour is still an issue? Move on, indeed.
And it annoys me because, though I haven't paid very close attention to the man, Obama strikes me as an exceptionally good person. I don't mean an exceptionally "moral" person; I mean someone who is both basically decent and exceptionally able to put his basic decency into action. (If I were an American and had voted for HRC as I was supposing I would have early on, I would have come to regret it and been relieved at the outcome.) You don't find many characters like this, not just in politics, but anywhere. (I'm trying to think of who strikes me as this kind of character--for some reason, Charlie Rose comes to mind, which then prompts me to think of Peter Gzowski. Howard Adelman. Chretien has probably been the closest thing to it in recent Canadian politics; Martin, who was more decent but less capable (which unfortunately seemed to lead him to surround himself with people who lacked his own decency, which unfortunately brings Rahm Emmanuel to mind), might have been in different circumstances. I feel like David Miller, the mayor of Toronto, could have been this kind of character if the deck wasn't stacked against him. Cito Gaston. Nader got lost somewhere in the neighbourhood. Preston Manning and Joe Clark were probably both separated from it mostly by their dorkiness, which, unfortunately, has a lot to do with capability.) Obama the decent, practical man of reason is something like something that some part of me might aspire to be. (Ignatieff is the sham version, the cautionary tale--pieces of it are right (Blood and Belonging) but the whole is wrong.) That this is overshadowed by the colour of his skin seems profoundly disrespectful of the man. (But would a white Obama have been a serious candidate for the Democratic nomination this time around in the first place?)
So I'm on strike, for the second time in my ten years at York. (I'm not on strike at Laurier.) The ideological stridency of the union--apparently including most of the members, a large majority of whom are grad students (a large majority of whom are in the humanities and social sciences), not just the activists and the leadership (such as it is, which isn't much, since the activists have gutted the leadership structure since the last strike)--is remarkable. I can't help but feel that some political switch has been flipped lately in North America. The resurgence of the NDP, the financial crisis, Obama, the settled feeling that Iraq and Afghanistan have both been lost ... it's hard to tell how it all fits together, but somehow it seems to. But where's it all going? The members of the union generally seem to sincerely believe that there are no legitimate interests in the university contrary to their own. They believe that they have a moral right to dictate terms, without limitation, to the university. Of course, labour generally feels that it has an unlimited moral right against management on the Marxist ground (whether particular workers or unions are fully conscious of this or not) that all value in the enterprise is produced by labour and so all value in the enterprise is owed to labour. What seems different about this union this time--and this union is always among the most militant and ideologically driven you'll find anywhere--is the more-or-less complete refusal to compromise on the absolute claim of right for pragmatic purposes. No dialogue, no dialectic, just sheer self-assertion.
What's interesting about the union as a labour union is that the basic issue no longer has anything to do with compensation for labour, though it is constantly portrayed that way in the media because no one can understand what's going on in any other terms. (The numbers quoted on wage increases are meaningless because the main monetary issues are not technically about wages.) I have a feeling that if the general public knew what the real issue was, the people who are currently calling for the TAs to be fired Reagan-style would be calling for the university to be shut down. TAs already are not paid primarily for the work they do as TAs; they're paid primarily to support them while they're (supposed to be) doing their graduate work. If the relevant market was the market for TA labour, their compensation would presumably be much lower than it currently is. TAs get as much as they do currently, and they want much more than that, because the relevant market is not the market for TA labour but the market for graduate students, and that's a market in which the student-TAs not only hold much more leverage (because while the supply of potential TA labour greatly exceeds the demand, the demand for grad students on the part of schools does not exceed the supply of potential students by much at all), but also benefit from an ethical feeling on the part of their superiors that grad students ought not to live too shabbily. (A few years back, TA negotiations at U of T were blown out of the water when the administration came up with a student-support package that made the demands for TA compensation largely irrelevant.)
What the union wants for the 25% of us in the union who teach courses on contract is a whole other kettle of fish. That's all about "job security", and it's a real concrete issue. Job security is the oppressively insistent practical issue in my life. But from a relatively disinterested point of view, considering only the good of the university or of the philosophy department, I would not want the make-up of the teaching staff to be determined in any serious way by union rules; I want departments to be free to decide their own compositions. Materially, there appears to be a lot at stake for me in this strike (because the administration appears to be proposing serious concessions on mechanisms that can turn contract jobs into permanent jobs), but I'm ethically opposed to winning it.
Similarly, the union is claiming a tactical "victory" in these negotiations for persuading the administration to withdraw a proposal to increase the number of teaching jobs allowed to doctoral students. It's a "victory" because it leaves more jobs open for people like me; it's very much in my material interests. But my job security currently might not be so desperately tenuous if I had been able to get a teaching position while doing my PhD; ethically, I can only be in favour of making more teaching positions available to doctoral students. So why doesn't the union recognize this "victory" as a defeat for the doctoral students it represents? Looks to me like some combination of these reasons:
(1) York doctoral students don't believe that they will ever have teaching jobs after they graduate (and so don't see themselves as having an interest in gaining teaching experience; some of them, when in union-rhetoric mode, actually spin having teaching jobs as opposed to TA positions as a burden, since they take up much more time and their compensation is taxable (whereas the large part of TA compensation that doesn't take the form of wages is classed as student support and therefore is mostly not taxable)).
(2) York doctoral students don't understand that the single most important thing in helping them get teaching jobs after they graduate is teaching experience (presumably due in part to their having swallowed the "publications" Koolaid, not realizing that publications=jobs only applies to students whose doctorates have prestigious brand-names).
(3) The union collectively sees its interest in keeping peace among the different constituencies of the union (and having more teaching positions available for doctoral students would more obviously and immediately damage the material interests of the current corps of contract teachers than it would advance the material interests of doctoral students) as being more important than increasing the employability of doctoral students--but this, to me, just dissolves back into (1).
I think (1) is really at the heart of everything. Everyone knows, now, that, in material terms, doing a PhD is a losing "investment" (unless you're invested in one of the prestigious brand-names), so doctoral students like those at York have stopped seeing it as any kind of investment at all. They want the material pay-off from academia now, because they don't expect to get it later.
The really stupid thing about York's situation is that it is largely a product of a strategy over the last decade to dramatically increase graduate enrolment. The strike of 2000-01 should have made it evident to everyone that graduate students at York are a box crammed full of hornets. But since then, the university administrators have crammed a whole bunch more hornets into the box and shaken it. (I don't fully understand why they've done this. There appear to be two main reasons behind it: they want to make York a more "research-intensive" university, and the provincial and/or federal governments have been putting pressure on universities to produce more PhDs to make up for the shortage of professors which is always just around the corner. The first reason has been motivated in some part by the fear that if York is classed as a "teaching" university, the province will sooner or later force it to shut down its graduate programs altogether--so, by drastically increasing graduate enrollment, we're creating facts on the ground that would make that impossible. I can't imagine that that isn't sheer paranoia. But there is also the plain prestige of being a "research" university; I think that probably has more to do with it than anything.) My guess is that they don't recognize what they're doing as shaking a box full of hornets because they, like--it seems to me--almost everyone who has made it in academia, operate under the delusion that grad students are (and feel themselves to be) on the road to being as successful as they are. Those who have made it imagine that those who have not (yet) made it would identify with them and aspire to be like them. Instead, those who have not (yet) made it almost universally resent those who have made it, more and more intensely all the time.
I wish to God the "first black president" business would blow away. When you make some symbolic move out of a long national embarrassment, is it really something to celebrate? Should your family throw a party when Daddy stops beating Mommy? Shouldn't you, with your newly gained virtue, only feel all the more embarrassed at what you've been? Isn't it embarrassing that the president's skin colour is still an issue? Move on, indeed.
And it annoys me because, though I haven't paid very close attention to the man, Obama strikes me as an exceptionally good person. I don't mean an exceptionally "moral" person; I mean someone who is both basically decent and exceptionally able to put his basic decency into action. (If I were an American and had voted for HRC as I was supposing I would have early on, I would have come to regret it and been relieved at the outcome.) You don't find many characters like this, not just in politics, but anywhere. (I'm trying to think of who strikes me as this kind of character--for some reason, Charlie Rose comes to mind, which then prompts me to think of Peter Gzowski. Howard Adelman. Chretien has probably been the closest thing to it in recent Canadian politics; Martin, who was more decent but less capable (which unfortunately seemed to lead him to surround himself with people who lacked his own decency, which unfortunately brings Rahm Emmanuel to mind), might have been in different circumstances. I feel like David Miller, the mayor of Toronto, could have been this kind of character if the deck wasn't stacked against him. Cito Gaston. Nader got lost somewhere in the neighbourhood. Preston Manning and Joe Clark were probably both separated from it mostly by their dorkiness, which, unfortunately, has a lot to do with capability.) Obama the decent, practical man of reason is something like something that some part of me might aspire to be. (Ignatieff is the sham version, the cautionary tale--pieces of it are right (Blood and Belonging) but the whole is wrong.) That this is overshadowed by the colour of his skin seems profoundly disrespectful of the man. (But would a white Obama have been a serious candidate for the Democratic nomination this time around in the first place?)
Thursday, October 23, 2008
I thought of the farm ... and the work to be done
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 7. High today: 9.
A couple of Old-Order Mennonites got on the bus at the Central Fresh Market in Kitchener yesterday, loaded down with--what? I always found it surprising and a little disappointing when the Mennonites showed up in the Central Fresh Market. What does the Central Fresh Market have that they can't grow or raise or whatever it is themselves? Well, anyway. I supposed to myself when they got on the bus that they wouldn't have voted in the election last week--I don't know; do Old-Order Mennonites vote?--and it doesn't matter to them who won. Maybe I'm wrong. I mean, it matters, sure, in that it makes some global difference if everyone keeps electing anti-environmentalists instead of environmentalists. Which reminds me of a story I read in highschool, in one of those anthologies of stories for highschool students, about somebody living in the northern woods of somewhere, who sees a strange light in the sky one day and then spends the next week, or month, or whatever it is, dying of radiation poisoning. (This was one of the most disturbing things I've ever read.) But look, it doesn't have to be a nuclear bomb; it might be an asteroid.
Anyway, I don't know anything about these Old-Order Mennonites really, but I imagine that what they do is they just live their lives. I'm probably wrong about them. I wonder, these people always make me wonder, and I see them fairly frequently in bus terminals, to what extent they live their lives reflectively. They must be aware that everyone, everyone, around them thinks they're crazy, or stupid, or both. Does it make them doubt themselves, or at least inquire into themselves?
The temptation to idealize a simple life is the temptation to idealize what Socrates calls the "healthy city" in the Republic. The healthy city, which lives within its means, is the "true" city, he says. The "kallipolis", the noble or beautiful city, which the Republic goes on to describe, is called the just city. (It just today struck me, unfortunately on my feet standing at the front of the classroom, that it is not clear that the Republic does not suggest that the just and the good are two different things and possibly in tension with each other--talk of "justice" has dropped out of the picture by the time the form of the good enters, and the good government of the kallipolis apparently requires the philosophers to neglect their natural function in order to rule.) The kallipolis is, by its nature, not healthy but feverish. It is founded on appetites run wild that engender conflict. The story implies that without conflict there would be no philosophy. As Heidegger says, you stop to examine the hammer as an object when it isn't doing the job. When everything is going smoothly, when there's no resistance, you don't reflect. Do you?
But what is reflection worth? "The unexamined life is not worth living"? Really? Heidegger points out (I don't know if this gets at the heart of the matter ... ) that for Plato the forms are images that guide the making of things. Plato launched productivism in philosophy. Eh, but mostly what Socrates wants to produce is some state of the soul. In the Republic, we want to know what justice is in order to be just in order to be happy. But "happiness" is stipulated as consisting in having your soul in order, not having one part pulling against another--which is to say, being ruled by reason, because reason tells you the one thing you should do, as opposed to the many different things you want to do. If you didn't want many different things in the first place, you wouldn't need reason's mandate to unify the soul and bring it peace. The happiness of the Republic is happiness for the complicated life. Glaucon's objection to the simple life is that it is a life for pigs. We human beings are complicated beings. Glaucon's objection is ambiguous between being an ethical claim and a natural one. The partisan of the simple life claims that we should not be so complicated. Socrates simply concedes Glaucon's point (though pausing to say that the healthy city is the "true" city. True to what?)
I'm the last person on the floor here tonight, which has made me the last line of possible assistance for two distressed students at mid-term time. Everyone seems so innocent when they're in distress.
A couple of Old-Order Mennonites got on the bus at the Central Fresh Market in Kitchener yesterday, loaded down with--what? I always found it surprising and a little disappointing when the Mennonites showed up in the Central Fresh Market. What does the Central Fresh Market have that they can't grow or raise or whatever it is themselves? Well, anyway. I supposed to myself when they got on the bus that they wouldn't have voted in the election last week--I don't know; do Old-Order Mennonites vote?--and it doesn't matter to them who won. Maybe I'm wrong. I mean, it matters, sure, in that it makes some global difference if everyone keeps electing anti-environmentalists instead of environmentalists. Which reminds me of a story I read in highschool, in one of those anthologies of stories for highschool students, about somebody living in the northern woods of somewhere, who sees a strange light in the sky one day and then spends the next week, or month, or whatever it is, dying of radiation poisoning. (This was one of the most disturbing things I've ever read.) But look, it doesn't have to be a nuclear bomb; it might be an asteroid.
Anyway, I don't know anything about these Old-Order Mennonites really, but I imagine that what they do is they just live their lives. I'm probably wrong about them. I wonder, these people always make me wonder, and I see them fairly frequently in bus terminals, to what extent they live their lives reflectively. They must be aware that everyone, everyone, around them thinks they're crazy, or stupid, or both. Does it make them doubt themselves, or at least inquire into themselves?
The temptation to idealize a simple life is the temptation to idealize what Socrates calls the "healthy city" in the Republic. The healthy city, which lives within its means, is the "true" city, he says. The "kallipolis", the noble or beautiful city, which the Republic goes on to describe, is called the just city. (It just today struck me, unfortunately on my feet standing at the front of the classroom, that it is not clear that the Republic does not suggest that the just and the good are two different things and possibly in tension with each other--talk of "justice" has dropped out of the picture by the time the form of the good enters, and the good government of the kallipolis apparently requires the philosophers to neglect their natural function in order to rule.) The kallipolis is, by its nature, not healthy but feverish. It is founded on appetites run wild that engender conflict. The story implies that without conflict there would be no philosophy. As Heidegger says, you stop to examine the hammer as an object when it isn't doing the job. When everything is going smoothly, when there's no resistance, you don't reflect. Do you?
But what is reflection worth? "The unexamined life is not worth living"? Really? Heidegger points out (I don't know if this gets at the heart of the matter ... ) that for Plato the forms are images that guide the making of things. Plato launched productivism in philosophy. Eh, but mostly what Socrates wants to produce is some state of the soul. In the Republic, we want to know what justice is in order to be just in order to be happy. But "happiness" is stipulated as consisting in having your soul in order, not having one part pulling against another--which is to say, being ruled by reason, because reason tells you the one thing you should do, as opposed to the many different things you want to do. If you didn't want many different things in the first place, you wouldn't need reason's mandate to unify the soul and bring it peace. The happiness of the Republic is happiness for the complicated life. Glaucon's objection to the simple life is that it is a life for pigs. We human beings are complicated beings. Glaucon's objection is ambiguous between being an ethical claim and a natural one. The partisan of the simple life claims that we should not be so complicated. Socrates simply concedes Glaucon's point (though pausing to say that the healthy city is the "true" city. True to what?)
I'm the last person on the floor here tonight, which has made me the last line of possible assistance for two distressed students at mid-term time. Everyone seems so innocent when they're in distress.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
At noon release another leaf
Currently at UW: 8.3. First snow of the cold season yesterday. Nothing on the ground around here, but some up toward Georgian Bay.
Overheard in the WLU library: "Why's there even an apostrophe in French?"
Qu'est-ce que c'est, cette question stupide?
Man overheard talking to TTC fare collector last week: "I have a picture here of my elbow with the hair shaved off."
I have spent the last hour or more poking through stuff on the web about the is-ought debate from the '60s and '70s, mostly to do with Searle's "How to Derive an Ought from an Is". I was just thinking again yesterday or so that I really need to not do things like spend, cumulatively, several weeks writing about the Gettier problem, but unfortunately I am now thinking of writing a paper called "Hobbes on Deriving an Ought from an Is". I don't really know anything much about either Hobbes or the is-ought debate. But I've been teaching Hobbes this week....
Things that make teaching difficult for me:
1. I regard how to teach philosophy as an open philosophical question.
2. I think that teaching and learning philosophy both require doing philosophy.
2. a) I regard how to do philosophy as an open philosophical question. (There are very few philosophy departments, as far as I can tell, that offer courses called "Philosophical Methods". In my experience, "Intro to Philosophy" courses don't even suggest that there might be such things as philosophical methods. I was doing my PhD before I really had much idea what about doing philosophy is. But it's extremely important! You can't do serious work in philosophy unless you have some idea what doing philosophy is. Can you?)
3. I think that philosophy has to dwell on the insights of great philosophers, because each of the great philosophers attempts to show an aspect of experience that is available to us all but difficult to attend to.
3. a) I think that any aspect of the thought of any great philosopher has to be understood in the context of their thought as a whole.
3. b) I think that philosophy must be read slowly and dialectically, moving back and forth between the abstract and the concrete.
3. c) I doubt that the thought of any philosopher is internally consistent. (The philosopher sees through many particular appearances, many eidoi, many forms, and attempts to describe the appearance, the eidos, the form. The form will only stand still if the same forms are seen through in the same way. This is not to say that there is no form, but that the form is indefinite and descriptions will not be consistent if they remain true to the shifting experience they are founded on. Thus the inconsistency of the philosopher is not a vice--rather, it is a virtue, because each inconsistent description provides a new perspective that deepens the whole--though the philosopher's failing to recognize it may be. On the other hand, the failure to recognize it may be a condition that makes it possible for the philosopher to go on, and it may be the condition that makes it possible for the student to go on with the philosopher. The student approaches the philosopher with the attitude of the judge, and witnesses who give inconsistent testimony are not reliable.)
4. I think that teaching philosophy well requires ongoing dialogue with each student individually.
(This is another thing that has become important to me about the many short assignments that I have my students do, which I often comment on extensively. These things are consuming my life! But I think they're serving an essential function.)
Overheard in the WLU library: "Why's there even an apostrophe in French?"
Qu'est-ce que c'est, cette question stupide?
Man overheard talking to TTC fare collector last week: "I have a picture here of my elbow with the hair shaved off."
I have spent the last hour or more poking through stuff on the web about the is-ought debate from the '60s and '70s, mostly to do with Searle's "How to Derive an Ought from an Is". I was just thinking again yesterday or so that I really need to not do things like spend, cumulatively, several weeks writing about the Gettier problem, but unfortunately I am now thinking of writing a paper called "Hobbes on Deriving an Ought from an Is". I don't really know anything much about either Hobbes or the is-ought debate. But I've been teaching Hobbes this week....
Things that make teaching difficult for me:
1. I regard how to teach philosophy as an open philosophical question.
2. I think that teaching and learning philosophy both require doing philosophy.
2. a) I regard how to do philosophy as an open philosophical question. (There are very few philosophy departments, as far as I can tell, that offer courses called "Philosophical Methods". In my experience, "Intro to Philosophy" courses don't even suggest that there might be such things as philosophical methods. I was doing my PhD before I really had much idea what about doing philosophy is. But it's extremely important! You can't do serious work in philosophy unless you have some idea what doing philosophy is. Can you?)
3. I think that philosophy has to dwell on the insights of great philosophers, because each of the great philosophers attempts to show an aspect of experience that is available to us all but difficult to attend to.
3. a) I think that any aspect of the thought of any great philosopher has to be understood in the context of their thought as a whole.
3. b) I think that philosophy must be read slowly and dialectically, moving back and forth between the abstract and the concrete.
3. c) I doubt that the thought of any philosopher is internally consistent. (The philosopher sees through many particular appearances, many eidoi, many forms, and attempts to describe the appearance, the eidos, the form. The form will only stand still if the same forms are seen through in the same way. This is not to say that there is no form, but that the form is indefinite and descriptions will not be consistent if they remain true to the shifting experience they are founded on. Thus the inconsistency of the philosopher is not a vice--rather, it is a virtue, because each inconsistent description provides a new perspective that deepens the whole--though the philosopher's failing to recognize it may be. On the other hand, the failure to recognize it may be a condition that makes it possible for the philosopher to go on, and it may be the condition that makes it possible for the student to go on with the philosopher. The student approaches the philosopher with the attitude of the judge, and witnesses who give inconsistent testimony are not reliable.)
4. I think that teaching philosophy well requires ongoing dialogue with each student individually.
(This is another thing that has become important to me about the many short assignments that I have my students do, which I often comment on extensively. These things are consuming my life! But I think they're serving an essential function.)
Thursday, October 16, 2008
I tried to remember things that the pastor used to say
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 11. High today: 14, at 1 a.m. and 3 p.m. Dewpoint's been slowly dropping all day from 12 at midnight to 3 at 4 p.m.
For the first time ever, the NDP has won seats in eight out of the ten provinces. The only two provinces they didn't win seats in are PEI and Saskatchewan. Ten years ago you could have won a lot of money betting that the NDP would someday win seats in eight of ten provinces but none in Saskatchewan, the home of Tommy Douglas and the heartland of the CCF. This is the third election in a row that the NDP has won no seats in Saskatchewan. The only other elections in which the NDP didn't win seats in Saskatchewan were the first three elections of its existence, when the prairie-populist Diefenbaker PCs won 50 of 51 seats in 1962, 1963, and 1965. The CCF was never shut out of Saskatchewan.
At least Bill Blaikie's successor beat Alex Steen's father in Winnipeg.
For the first time ever, the NDP has won seats in eight out of the ten provinces. The only two provinces they didn't win seats in are PEI and Saskatchewan. Ten years ago you could have won a lot of money betting that the NDP would someday win seats in eight of ten provinces but none in Saskatchewan, the home of Tommy Douglas and the heartland of the CCF. This is the third election in a row that the NDP has won no seats in Saskatchewan. The only other elections in which the NDP didn't win seats in Saskatchewan were the first three elections of its existence, when the prairie-populist Diefenbaker PCs won 50 of 51 seats in 1962, 1963, and 1965. The CCF was never shut out of Saskatchewan.
At least Bill Blaikie's successor beat Alex Steen's father in Winnipeg.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Deflation
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 11. High today: 14.
Now is that early-to-mid-October time when all us low-rent types shiver in our boxes until the landlord turns the heat on. I see the building across the road has heat, as people are opening their windows.
If you read the Globe regularly or otherwise keep up with the often-dizzyingly-contradictory pronouncements of the top Canadian economists, you will not be hearing this here first, but it bears repeating, because it's going to take a while to sink in, and a lot of people won't ever believe it: we could have deflation in Canada before long. There was one headline about this in the Globe last month; I've just gotten around to looking at the StatsCan inflation report for August, which the news was very excited about because it showed the highest rate of inflation since 2003 (!), and the signs are there: while the CPI for energy was up 20% year-over-year, it was down 3% month-over-month. Goods overall: +3.5% year-over-year, -0.5 month-over-month. Transportation: +5.8% year-over-year; -2.1% month-over-month. I guess--and I'm only guessing--the one that will determine whether we actually go into deflation or not will be shelter, which was up 5.8% year-over-year and up 0.4% month-over-month, which, incredibly, since we're all talking about the cooling real estate market and also about inflation in food prices, is still higher than the month-over-month rate of inflation for food. Then again, I guess the dollar losing a cent a day against the US$ might have something to say about it. I'm just guessin' here, like everybody.
My other favourite bit of statistics today: according to the latest Harris-Decima tracking poll,
the Conservatives are now in fourth place among single Canadian women. The Greens and the Liberals are tied for second, behind the NDP.
Uh, by the way, has anyone seen a TV ad from the Liberals during this campaign? I'm seeing Green ads just about every day, not to mention the bunches of Conservative and NDP ads; I don't specifically recall seeing a Liberal ad. I think I probably saw one or two, a couple of weeks ago, but I'm not sure.
Now is that early-to-mid-October time when all us low-rent types shiver in our boxes until the landlord turns the heat on. I see the building across the road has heat, as people are opening their windows.
If you read the Globe regularly or otherwise keep up with the often-dizzyingly-contradictory pronouncements of the top Canadian economists, you will not be hearing this here first, but it bears repeating, because it's going to take a while to sink in, and a lot of people won't ever believe it: we could have deflation in Canada before long. There was one headline about this in the Globe last month; I've just gotten around to looking at the StatsCan inflation report for August, which the news was very excited about because it showed the highest rate of inflation since 2003 (!), and the signs are there: while the CPI for energy was up 20% year-over-year, it was down 3% month-over-month. Goods overall: +3.5% year-over-year, -0.5 month-over-month. Transportation: +5.8% year-over-year; -2.1% month-over-month. I guess--and I'm only guessing--the one that will determine whether we actually go into deflation or not will be shelter, which was up 5.8% year-over-year and up 0.4% month-over-month, which, incredibly, since we're all talking about the cooling real estate market and also about inflation in food prices, is still higher than the month-over-month rate of inflation for food. Then again, I guess the dollar losing a cent a day against the US$ might have something to say about it. I'm just guessin' here, like everybody.
My other favourite bit of statistics today: according to the latest Harris-Decima tracking poll,
the Conservatives are now in fourth place among single Canadian women. The Greens and the Liberals are tied for second, behind the NDP.
Uh, by the way, has anyone seen a TV ad from the Liberals during this campaign? I'm seeing Green ads just about every day, not to mention the bunches of Conservative and NDP ads; I don't specifically recall seeing a Liberal ad. I think I probably saw one or two, a couple of weeks ago, but I'm not sure.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Time isn't holding us
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 18. High today: 24. Low was 12; in KW, the spread was 25-7. At Toronto Island: 21-14.
Find the ace of the Rays' pitching staff: in 27 starts this year, Scott Kazmir has pitched more than six innings six times. (Five of those were consecutive, in May and June; the last one was July 21.) In 32 starts, James Shields has pitched more than six innings 24 times. And it's not that the Rays are babying Kazmir's wonky arm: twice this year, Kazmir has thrown 110 pitches in less than five innings. (I was expecting that Kazmir would comfortably lead the AL in pitches/inning this year, but he's actually going to be runner up, by my calculations, for that title, which is instead going to the old Blue Jays poet laureate Miguel Batista.)
It will be so nice next year when the Yankees don't make the playoffs and it's not that interesting.
On one hand, I can see why academics moan about teaching getting in the way of their "research"--I'm only teaching two courses this term, and I'm really not going to have time to do any serious writing, mostly because of all the marking I'm going to be doing. (I could set up my courses so that I have much less marking to do, by having the students write fewer, longer things, instead of the many short things I have them write, but I'm convinced that many short things are better for them and make me want to blow my head off less, even though I spend more time on them.) On the other hand, teaching makes me read texts in such an intense way! It was teaching that got me into Plato in the first place, and it was teaching that gave birth to my Meno paper. My Republic class is doing about a book a week; we're on to Book 3 this week. Everyone knows there's lots going on in Book 1, and lots going on from the middle to the end, but I was a bit worried about whether there would be enough in each of Books 2 and 3 to support a whole class. Well, there's always a bonanza in Plato, if you just look. In Books 2 and 3, what looks puzzlingly like repetition at first glance (and every subsequent glance) turns out to be variation with an essential difference, if you look. Adeimantus says that Glaucon's case for injustice in Book 2 isn't put strongly enough, it has left out the most important thing, and then he seems to repeat the case Glaucon has just made. The difference (but I owe this one to Allan Bloom) is announced in the first words Adeimantus says in his speech that is going to strengthen Glaucon's case by pointing out the most important thing: "What fathers tell their sons ... ". No convincing case can be made in favour of justice unless fathers stop telling their sons stories about the gods and the heroes in which crime pays. It doesn't matter whether the stories are true or not. Glaucon wanted what the stories say to be refuted; Adeimantus's point is that the force of the stories defies refutation because it's engrained in people when they are children. This is what Socrates tells the jury in the Apology (and I notice this connection because we did the Apology in my Laurier class): I can't convince you of my innocence because I have already been convicted by the stories you've heard about me all your lives.
Another thing that shows itself when you look is that Books 2 and 3, despite appearances, each form organic wholes, and the breaks at the end of each occur in logical places. Glaucon begins his case for injustice with an account of the genesis of justice in the genesis of the polis; Adeimantus then makes his case that justice will have to overcome the stories promoting injustice. Socrates begins his answer by giving an account of the genesis of the polis, which is supposed to yield an account of justice, and this carries on into an account of how the stories told to children (or, at least, to the future guardians of the polis) should be changed.
The beginning of Book 3 seems to just continue the account of how stories should be changed, but now the account moves in turn through each of the virtues that the stories should instill. Courage appears right at the beginning of Book 3: the stories must not promote fear of the afterlife and hence of death. Next, stories must not promote immoderation, as they do when they have Zeus unable to control his lust and Achilles susceptible to bribery. Next, stories must not promote impiety, as they do when Achilles is angry at a river-god. Three virtues down--how about justice, then? Can't do that yet, says Socrates; we still don't know what it is. Let's talk about the styles of stories, instead. Stories shouldn't have too much dialogue in them--they shouldn't imitate others too much. In fact, they should only imitate the best people, at their best. Why? Eventually it comes out that stories shouldn't have too much dialogue, they shouldn't try to get into too many different characters, because people are supposed to concentrate on being themselves--they're supposed to do their own work, hone their own virtue which is proper to their own particular work, and this can't be done if we're trying to get into too many different people's heads. And the dialogue moves on, and the significance of this puzzling discussion of dialogue, which would have Plato's works banned from the city, only comes to the surface in Book 4: the nature of justice, Socrates says, has been there in front of them all along, ever since they started describing how a city comes to be; justice is a matter of each doing their own work, each doing and being as is fitting for them. So in Book 3, Socrates says that the discussion of how justice should be promoted in stories would have to be left off until they had decided what justice is, but then he immediately launches into a discussion of how justice should be promoted in stories--not in their substance, but in their style.
When he has finished the discussion of the muse-ical training of the guardians, Socrates says that this training will show the budding guardians the forms of the virtues, so that they will recognize them later on when they are presented with rational accounts of them. (He doesn't say it as clearly as that, but by way of an initially puzzling analogy with learning letters on the way to learning words and sentences.) Book 3 shows us the forms of the virtues, of which we will subsequently be provided rational accounts.
But Book 3 doesn't show us the forms of all the virtues. One cardinal virtue doesn't appear in Book 3, namely, wisdom. (Even piety appears, though piety is left out of Book 4's discussion of the civic virtues.) Wisdom appears at the beginning of Book 4, and begins the process of sorting through the civic virtues of wisdom, justice, and moderation, to try to find justice as the remainder after the other three have been outlined. At the beginning of Book 4, wisdom is identified as the virtue proper to the rulers, who are wise because they know the city as a whole. (The polis-psuche analogy would have it therefore that those people are wise who know themselves as wholes.) The rulers appear at the end of Book 3, when, after completing the discussion of the muse-ical and physical training of the guardians, and pointing out, again, the dual nature of the guardians--this is the point with which the discussion of their education began; they must be "spirited", thumotic, aggressive, but they must also be gentle toward their own people--Socrates suddenly asks: which among them are to be the rulers and which are to be the ruled? Nothing seems to motivate this question. Does it go without saying that there must be a class above the guardians to tell them what to do? Maybe ... not likely. The question comes right after Socrates repeats that the guardians must partake of both natures, the spirited and the gentle. He splits the guardian class in half right after he says that. The implication that seems to insist itself is that such dual-natured guardians are impossible. Wisdom doesn't appear in Book 3 because the basically thumotic guardians aren't up for it.
And now the library is closing--and I haven't even gotten anywhere near the best thing I've discovered, about Thrasymachus's confusion in Book 1!
Find the ace of the Rays' pitching staff: in 27 starts this year, Scott Kazmir has pitched more than six innings six times. (Five of those were consecutive, in May and June; the last one was July 21.) In 32 starts, James Shields has pitched more than six innings 24 times. And it's not that the Rays are babying Kazmir's wonky arm: twice this year, Kazmir has thrown 110 pitches in less than five innings. (I was expecting that Kazmir would comfortably lead the AL in pitches/inning this year, but he's actually going to be runner up, by my calculations, for that title, which is instead going to the old Blue Jays poet laureate Miguel Batista.)
It will be so nice next year when the Yankees don't make the playoffs and it's not that interesting.
On one hand, I can see why academics moan about teaching getting in the way of their "research"--I'm only teaching two courses this term, and I'm really not going to have time to do any serious writing, mostly because of all the marking I'm going to be doing. (I could set up my courses so that I have much less marking to do, by having the students write fewer, longer things, instead of the many short things I have them write, but I'm convinced that many short things are better for them and make me want to blow my head off less, even though I spend more time on them.) On the other hand, teaching makes me read texts in such an intense way! It was teaching that got me into Plato in the first place, and it was teaching that gave birth to my Meno paper. My Republic class is doing about a book a week; we're on to Book 3 this week. Everyone knows there's lots going on in Book 1, and lots going on from the middle to the end, but I was a bit worried about whether there would be enough in each of Books 2 and 3 to support a whole class. Well, there's always a bonanza in Plato, if you just look. In Books 2 and 3, what looks puzzlingly like repetition at first glance (and every subsequent glance) turns out to be variation with an essential difference, if you look. Adeimantus says that Glaucon's case for injustice in Book 2 isn't put strongly enough, it has left out the most important thing, and then he seems to repeat the case Glaucon has just made. The difference (but I owe this one to Allan Bloom) is announced in the first words Adeimantus says in his speech that is going to strengthen Glaucon's case by pointing out the most important thing: "What fathers tell their sons ... ". No convincing case can be made in favour of justice unless fathers stop telling their sons stories about the gods and the heroes in which crime pays. It doesn't matter whether the stories are true or not. Glaucon wanted what the stories say to be refuted; Adeimantus's point is that the force of the stories defies refutation because it's engrained in people when they are children. This is what Socrates tells the jury in the Apology (and I notice this connection because we did the Apology in my Laurier class): I can't convince you of my innocence because I have already been convicted by the stories you've heard about me all your lives.
Another thing that shows itself when you look is that Books 2 and 3, despite appearances, each form organic wholes, and the breaks at the end of each occur in logical places. Glaucon begins his case for injustice with an account of the genesis of justice in the genesis of the polis; Adeimantus then makes his case that justice will have to overcome the stories promoting injustice. Socrates begins his answer by giving an account of the genesis of the polis, which is supposed to yield an account of justice, and this carries on into an account of how the stories told to children (or, at least, to the future guardians of the polis) should be changed.
The beginning of Book 3 seems to just continue the account of how stories should be changed, but now the account moves in turn through each of the virtues that the stories should instill. Courage appears right at the beginning of Book 3: the stories must not promote fear of the afterlife and hence of death. Next, stories must not promote immoderation, as they do when they have Zeus unable to control his lust and Achilles susceptible to bribery. Next, stories must not promote impiety, as they do when Achilles is angry at a river-god. Three virtues down--how about justice, then? Can't do that yet, says Socrates; we still don't know what it is. Let's talk about the styles of stories, instead. Stories shouldn't have too much dialogue in them--they shouldn't imitate others too much. In fact, they should only imitate the best people, at their best. Why? Eventually it comes out that stories shouldn't have too much dialogue, they shouldn't try to get into too many different characters, because people are supposed to concentrate on being themselves--they're supposed to do their own work, hone their own virtue which is proper to their own particular work, and this can't be done if we're trying to get into too many different people's heads. And the dialogue moves on, and the significance of this puzzling discussion of dialogue, which would have Plato's works banned from the city, only comes to the surface in Book 4: the nature of justice, Socrates says, has been there in front of them all along, ever since they started describing how a city comes to be; justice is a matter of each doing their own work, each doing and being as is fitting for them. So in Book 3, Socrates says that the discussion of how justice should be promoted in stories would have to be left off until they had decided what justice is, but then he immediately launches into a discussion of how justice should be promoted in stories--not in their substance, but in their style.
When he has finished the discussion of the muse-ical training of the guardians, Socrates says that this training will show the budding guardians the forms of the virtues, so that they will recognize them later on when they are presented with rational accounts of them. (He doesn't say it as clearly as that, but by way of an initially puzzling analogy with learning letters on the way to learning words and sentences.) Book 3 shows us the forms of the virtues, of which we will subsequently be provided rational accounts.
But Book 3 doesn't show us the forms of all the virtues. One cardinal virtue doesn't appear in Book 3, namely, wisdom. (Even piety appears, though piety is left out of Book 4's discussion of the civic virtues.) Wisdom appears at the beginning of Book 4, and begins the process of sorting through the civic virtues of wisdom, justice, and moderation, to try to find justice as the remainder after the other three have been outlined. At the beginning of Book 4, wisdom is identified as the virtue proper to the rulers, who are wise because they know the city as a whole. (The polis-psuche analogy would have it therefore that those people are wise who know themselves as wholes.) The rulers appear at the end of Book 3, when, after completing the discussion of the muse-ical and physical training of the guardians, and pointing out, again, the dual nature of the guardians--this is the point with which the discussion of their education began; they must be "spirited", thumotic, aggressive, but they must also be gentle toward their own people--Socrates suddenly asks: which among them are to be the rulers and which are to be the ruled? Nothing seems to motivate this question. Does it go without saying that there must be a class above the guardians to tell them what to do? Maybe ... not likely. The question comes right after Socrates repeats that the guardians must partake of both natures, the spirited and the gentle. He splits the guardian class in half right after he says that. The implication that seems to insist itself is that such dual-natured guardians are impossible. Wisdom doesn't appear in Book 3 because the basically thumotic guardians aren't up for it.
And now the library is closing--and I haven't even gotten anywhere near the best thing I've discovered, about Thrasymachus's confusion in Book 1!
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Make the day seem to us less brief
Currently in KW: 24. Down to 6 here this morning.
We're in one of those September stretches (but I keep thinking it's October--whenever I get busy, I'm always thinking it's later than it is; yesterday felt all day long like some Wednesday in the middle of October) when there's no clouds for days and the bottom has dropped out of the air but the sun's still got some kick to it and there's no flow of cold air whisking away the sun-heated air, so the daily temperature spread can get near 20 degrees ... at least it can here in KW; not so much back in the urban heat bubble and lake-breeze zone--it's 22 at Pearson right now, and got down to 11 this morning. I'm surprised again this year at how much earlier the trees change here than they do in Toronto (and how much redder the maple reds are).
When I sat down here in the WLU library, it occurred to me, among the general murmur (which unfortunately was a low ebb; it's now up to the dull roar that's been standard here on what I call the party floor for the last several years), that this must be not unlike the monastery libraries in the days before people figured out that they could read without talking.
The guy walking around yakking on his cellphone, on the other hand....
Last night I heard an ad on the radio during the Jays game, one of those phone ads with someone singing a song about how they don't love their phone anymore, and the ad says you should love your phone and let us help you get a phone to love, and I heard a line in the song about how she doesn't love her phone anymore and her phone is two or three years old ... two or three years old! I have a phone. You know how old my phone is? I don't know how old my phone is. My phone is older than my memory. It was in my house before I knew what phones were.
I'm teaching the Republic in both of my courses now. (One course is just on the Republic; in the other, we're moving on to Aristotle and so on next week.) There's so much to be said! But I can't take the time to say it. If I had the time to say it, there wouldn't be so much to be said. This is very close to one of the lessons of the Republic.
Didn't see the no-tail squirrel on Monday (though I was steaming by in a hurry for the Greyhound). This week it died of natural causes.
We're in one of those September stretches (but I keep thinking it's October--whenever I get busy, I'm always thinking it's later than it is; yesterday felt all day long like some Wednesday in the middle of October) when there's no clouds for days and the bottom has dropped out of the air but the sun's still got some kick to it and there's no flow of cold air whisking away the sun-heated air, so the daily temperature spread can get near 20 degrees ... at least it can here in KW; not so much back in the urban heat bubble and lake-breeze zone--it's 22 at Pearson right now, and got down to 11 this morning. I'm surprised again this year at how much earlier the trees change here than they do in Toronto (and how much redder the maple reds are).
When I sat down here in the WLU library, it occurred to me, among the general murmur (which unfortunately was a low ebb; it's now up to the dull roar that's been standard here on what I call the party floor for the last several years), that this must be not unlike the monastery libraries in the days before people figured out that they could read without talking.
The guy walking around yakking on his cellphone, on the other hand....
Last night I heard an ad on the radio during the Jays game, one of those phone ads with someone singing a song about how they don't love their phone anymore, and the ad says you should love your phone and let us help you get a phone to love, and I heard a line in the song about how she doesn't love her phone anymore and her phone is two or three years old ... two or three years old! I have a phone. You know how old my phone is? I don't know how old my phone is. My phone is older than my memory. It was in my house before I knew what phones were.
I'm teaching the Republic in both of my courses now. (One course is just on the Republic; in the other, we're moving on to Aristotle and so on next week.) There's so much to be said! But I can't take the time to say it. If I had the time to say it, there wouldn't be so much to be said. This is very close to one of the lessons of the Republic.
Didn't see the no-tail squirrel on Monday (though I was steaming by in a hurry for the Greyhound). This week it died of natural causes.
Friday, September 19, 2008
All rose, exchanging smiles.
Currently at Toronto Pearson: 17. High today: 18.
Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome to the show. So, big news this week, the American government has nationalized the banking industry. I guess that means Communism wins after all!
On Monday I didn't see the no-tail squirrel and I looked around for it but it was missing and I thought I HAVE KILLED THE NO-TAIL SQUIRREL WITH OLD SALTY ALMONDS and now there is no more no-tail squirrel because of me and all the people who love the no-tail squirrel will not see it anymore and be sad because I HAVE KILLED THE NO-TAIL SQUIRREL WITH OLD SALTY ALMONDS. So on Wednesday I decided that I would go and eat my lunch in the place where I see the no-tail squirrel and hope that it would appear and not be dead of old salty almonds. When I got there, I saw a black squirrel whose tail I could not see but maybe its tail was behind a leaf and so I hopefully approached and it moved and its tail appeared from behind a leaf. So I sat down at a picnic table and opened my tuna-fish sandwich and then I saw another black squirrel whose tail I could not see at the top of the hill and so I left my tuna-fish sandwich and hopefully approached and it moved and it HAD NO TAIL.
I have not killed the no-tail squirrel with old salty almonds. But I have resolved not to feed any more wild animals anything ever. Although L. scoffs and says squirrels eat garbage and food wrappers and things and they're like indestructable, and such reasoning will probably weaken my resolve sooner or later.
Good evening ladies and gentlemen and welcome to the show. So, big news this week, the American government has nationalized the banking industry. I guess that means Communism wins after all!
On Monday I didn't see the no-tail squirrel and I looked around for it but it was missing and I thought I HAVE KILLED THE NO-TAIL SQUIRREL WITH OLD SALTY ALMONDS and now there is no more no-tail squirrel because of me and all the people who love the no-tail squirrel will not see it anymore and be sad because I HAVE KILLED THE NO-TAIL SQUIRREL WITH OLD SALTY ALMONDS. So on Wednesday I decided that I would go and eat my lunch in the place where I see the no-tail squirrel and hope that it would appear and not be dead of old salty almonds. When I got there, I saw a black squirrel whose tail I could not see but maybe its tail was behind a leaf and so I hopefully approached and it moved and its tail appeared from behind a leaf. So I sat down at a picnic table and opened my tuna-fish sandwich and then I saw another black squirrel whose tail I could not see at the top of the hill and so I left my tuna-fish sandwich and hopefully approached and it moved and it HAD NO TAIL.
I have not killed the no-tail squirrel with old salty almonds. But I have resolved not to feed any more wild animals anything ever. Although L. scoffs and says squirrels eat garbage and food wrappers and things and they're like indestructable, and such reasoning will probably weaken my resolve sooner or later.
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